• INTRODUCTION
• POLITICAL SITUATION
• ELECTIONS
• IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES
• POLITICAL PARTIES
• SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
• OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES
• OPPOSITIONAL YOUTH MOVEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The local elections of 2007 have shown again that President Lukashenka holds firm control of the Belarusian politics and its economy. According international organisations, the elections were flawed and could not meet the international standards for free and fair elections. The opposition was unable to gain significant support, so the pro-government parties were the big winners of the local elections. As a result of the elections, any hopeful signs that might have been present were crushed by a wave of new repressions of oppositional activists. In the run-up to the fall 2008 parliamentary elections, Lukashenka allowed 42 opposition members into the district electoral commissions. However, the small amount of 42 representatives – constituting 3% - will not be able to make a difference anyway.

According to Zmitser Shymanski, candidate of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front "this success is very relative, because all falsifications take place at the level of polling-station commissions. Naturally, for me as a candidate for parliament, the only indication that the election will be transparent is if they include people I trust in all polling-station commissions [in my district]." The process of commission forming is also very mysterious, as the names of the members are simply announced, without anyone (themselves included) knowing about the formation beforehand.

The outcomes did not come as a surprise. Since 1994, Lukashenka has put much effort in marginalising the opposition by creating an atmosphere of repression and intimidation. In addition, the opposition was divided on the issue of whether or not to boycott the 2008 Parliamentary elections. Some hopeful voices were heard as the President released political prisoners in the run-up to the election, including the 'last political prisoner of Europe' Alyaksandr Kazulin. The act was a gesture towards the EU, with which Lukashenko was forced to seek rapprochement as his relations with the Kremlin cooled over increasing gas prices.

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POLITICAL SITUATION

Belarus is an increasingly authoritarian presidential republic, where the president dominates political life and no real opposition is allowed. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who is in power since 1994, managed to retain power at the end of his first presidential term through re-organizing the highest bodies of state power and strengthening the highest organs of executive power. Legitimate institutions have lost the influence while illegitimate institutions gained more power. In order to be able to run for a third term of presidency, Lukashenka called for a referendum to change to constitution in 2004. The referendum itself was widely contested; the outcomes of the referendum even more.

Most of the opposition parties chose to boycott the 2000 parliamentary elections to demonstrate their discontent with the reorganised parliamentary structure. They placed themselves outside the official political arena and had to operate in a repressive climate. In the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary elections, most of those opposition parties did decide to take part in the elections. As the referendum, also the 2004 parliamentary elections fell short of democratic standards. Through the years Alyaksandr Lukashenka tightened his grip and minimised the possibilities for democratic forces to organise themselves or get their messages across to the people of Belarus, who as a result hardly know of the existence of a democratic alternative.

The flawed 19 March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus showed again the dictatorial face of President Lukashenka’s regime. The democratic opposition did not have the chance to campaign freely in favour of their presidential candidates, united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich and former Belarusian State University rector Alyaksandr Kazulin. The days before the elections were marked by mass-detentions. As a result, the elections took place in a climate of fear. International observers and the democratic opposition have condemned the poll, which showed 82,6 percent for President Lukashenka and 6 percent for the main opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich.

On the evening of election day and the days afterwards, people gathered in the centre of Minsk to protest against the falsifications. Milinkevich called for repeated elections. Though special police forces were ready to intervene, they “only” arresting some people who came and went. The scale of the demonstrations, though not as massive as in Ukraine during the “Orange Revolution”, are the largest anti-governmental protests since nearly 10 years, which shows opposition is able to show themselves and can seriously challenge the climate of fear in which they operate. On 25 March 2006, the oppositional protest ended. The participants adopted a declaration demanding that a new presidential election be held and that all people detained in the past few days be released.

The following local elections of January 2007, which were as flawed as the presidential elections of 2006 and the parliamentary elections of 2004. The elections were therefore heavily criticised by both the OSCE and the European Commission. The opposition is nowadays less united than it was before the presidential elections of 2006. The numerous problems and different factions within the opposition give the impression that a united opposition is further away than before the presidential elections of 2006.

The most recent political momentum was the parliamentary election of 28 September 2008. It was preceded by hopeful expectations triggered by an apparent thaw in the Lukashenko regime, as he released political prisoners and allowed slightly more freedom to candidates in their campaignes. Most likely, this was a gesture directed at the Western countries and specifically the EU, which Lukashenko was trying to win over in the face of his cooling relations with Russia. However, as no opposition candidate managed to enter the parliament in the said elections his eagerness was apparently not immense. After the elections all eyes turned to the EU for its reaction, which came as a decision to freeze visa sanctions for high-ranking Belarus officials - including the president - anyway, so as to promote a policy of dialogue since the previous sanctions did not seem to work.

The opposition in 2006 and 2007
After the presidential elections of 2006, the opposition forces showed great changes in their organisational structure and their level of cohesion. Shortly after the local elections of 2007, the united opposition (with leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich) started to show hairline cracks in the level of unification of the opposition. During a meeting of the political council of the Democratic Forces in January 2007, the council voted in favour of an rotational presidency of the council. So, in stead of one united opposition leader, the coalition’s leadership would rotate periodically. This was against the will of Alyaksandr Milinkevich. He stated that “If we had developed democracy, I wouldn’t object to the rotational principle, be we live in Belarus, under the conditions of a dictatorship, and no one has even managed to defeat a dictatorship without a single leader.”

Already in December 2006, the Belarusian Party of Communist, the Women's Party "Nadzeya" and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party "Hramada" tried to register as a left-wing alliance called "Union of Left Parties (ULP)". However, the justice ministry rejeced the registration because the Union's founding conference was held in Ukraine, in stead of Belarus. The reason for the Ukraine was because the the Union couldn't lease a venue in Belarus. The Union tried to apply again in August 2007, but this was again refused.

In February 2007, the council decided to hold the Second Congress of the Pro-democratic Forces on 17 and 18 March. At the first congress in 2005, Milinkevich was elected as opposition candidate for the 2006 presidential elections. His disagreement with the rotational presidency made Milinkevich decide to not participate in the upcoming congress. On 7 March 2007, the United Civic Party leader Anatol Lyabedzka (part of the Democratic Forces) announced that the Congress of mid-March was called-off due to organisational and technical problems. In the meantime, Milinkevich was heavily criticised by the imprisoned Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H) leader Alyaksandr Kazulin. Kazulin stated that Milinkevich was jeopardising the Coalition, in stead of acting as a uniting figure. Kazulin supported the rotational presidency.

In April, it was decided that the Second Congress would be held in May. Alyaksandr Milinkevich was one of the leaders who agreed on this new date. He rejoined the Coalition once he had the assurance that any decision on the leadership of the Coalition would be taken after a series of seven regional congresses in early May. On 22 May, opposition politician Statkevich and opposition youth-leader Pavel Sevyarynets were released after being sentenced since 2005.

At the Second Congress of the Democratic Forces on 26-27 May in Minsk, the 600 delegates decided to replace former presidential-candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich with four co-leaders. The new Council is formed by Anatol Lyabedzka (United Civic Party), Vintsuk Vyachorka (Belarusian Popular Front), Syarhey Kalyakin (Belarusian Party of Communist) and Anatol Lyaukovich (acting head of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada). The congress adopted also a “strategy of action” envisaging a “constructive dialogue with the authorities”. Milinkevich reacted by stating that “The fight for power in the country has been replaced by a fight for power among the opposition.” In reaction to his replacement, Milinkevich announced to start a new organisation: the Movement for Freedom, which will be independent but with close links to the Political Council of the Democratic Forces.

Milinkevich stated that his Movement for Freedom will be based on two pillars: a political and a civic one. The political part of the organisation will be dealing with election campaigns, training and support for non-party and party-candidates, information delivery and mass-protest. The civic part of the organisation is the main part. The Movement for Freedom has the goal to unite the diverse, and often developed pro-democratic organisations from the Belarusian third sector. Milinkevich underlines that he doesn’t want to suspend his ties with the Democratic Forces and its Political Council and that we does not have the intention to start an own political party.

In July 2007 the state officially rejected the application to registration of the Movement for Freedom. The Justice Ministry rejected the movement's application for registration, citing alleged flaws in the organisation's charter as the grounds.

However, despite the fact that the state tries to frustrate the opposition as much as possible, it should be stated that the lack of cohesion within the opposition forces could also be named as a reason for the relatively weak position of opposition parties.

 

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ELECTIONS

 Preparations for the September 2008 parliamentary elections
As the parliamentary elections were approaching, the main democratic opposition forces seemed to have lost their faith in any possibility of victory. In fact, their goals for this period were simply to use the campaigning period to inform the Belarus public of the benefits of democracy by arguing against the prevalent link made between democracy and the crisis of the 90s. They aimed to convince as many people as possible to engage in oppositional activities. Considering the watchfulness of the KGB and the risks connected to any such activity it is understandable that many ordinary Belarusians were and are cautious, to say the least. Anyone engaging in opposition activities faces a very real risk of losing their employment, freedom, and in some cases even life.

Personal Conflicts
According to Western advisors, another difficulty contributing to the weakness of the opposition, is the inability of the opposition to unite effectively. One of the main factors contributing to that division concerns personal conflicts between various opposition leaders. A good example is the controversial rift within the Belarus Social Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada (BSDP NH) as a result of which the party was divided into two wings under two different leaders: Alyksandr Kazulin and Mikola Statkevich. The division became very personal when Anatol Levkovich, vice-president of the split-off wing and acting leader after Kazulin’s arrest in 2006, was accused by Statkevich of writing reports to the authorities, as a result of which Statkevich was imprisoned for two and a half years. Statkevich also stepped out of the UDF and eventually set up the European Coalition Free Belarus which includes public associations Charter-97 and the Youth Front as well as Statkevich’s BSDP NH.

Former president Shushkevich, did not join UDF or the European Coalition, and is running with his own party list, namely the Belarus Social Democratic Hramada (BSDH).

The UDF, which encompassed 11 political parties and was calling for a complete unification of the democratic opposition, managed to put forward a unified list of 110 candidates from all constituencies, including Olga Kazulina (daughter of Alyksandr Kazulin). This process is strongly supported by the NDI and the IRI, who called upon the Europeans to stop supporting any other marginal groups outside of the UDF.

In the run-up towards the elections, the only issue that seemed to unite the entire spectrum of the opposition concerned the repressive policies of president Lukashenko. According to most Western advisors the best policy in the face of such a rigid authoritarian regime would be maximal unification. In response, opposition leaders like Statkevich and Shushkevich declared that they are, indeed, in total agreement when it comes to their one uniting cause, i.e. opposing the regime. However, their views differ on other subjects. For instance, Statkevich is ready to discuss unification under the condition of European integration becoming one of the major campaign focal points. This is unacceptable to the UDF because, according to Statkevich, some members of the coalition (and especially the Communist Party) have pro-Russian inclinations. Taking into consideration the already mentioned past personal conflicts between the opposition leaders, complete unification remained a very questionable prospect.

Boycott?
Another divisional issue concerned the question of whether or not to boycott the elections. As most opposition forces were in agreement concerning their low expectations from the elections, some argued that it is better not to legitimize the elections by partaking in them. Others suggested that it is only by participating in the elections that they can show the international community how repressive the regime really is. A suggested middle way was to actively participate in the entire campaigning period and convince as many people as possible to join the democratic opposition, and then withdraw from the race on the eve of the elections. The benefit would be that it still leaves the entire campaigning period for conveying the opposition’s message to the masses (as well as possible under given conditions) while making a strong statement of protest by withdrawing from the race at the last minute. The downfall is that the situation can be ‘spinned’ by the authorities very easily in depicting the opposition’s withdrawal as a realisation that they cannot win, and do not want to make a bad impression on their foreign investors (i.e. the West).

It should be noted, that during a July 15 (2008) round table with Members of European Parliament in Brussels, none of the Belarusian delegation members present (i.e. Stanislau Shushkevich, Olga Kazulina and Mikola Statkevich) argued in favour of a boycott.

Results of the 2008 Parliamentary elections
After months of speculations concerning the apparent thaw in the Lukashenko regime and the issue of the possible boycott of the elections by the opposition - on which it remained divided - not a single oppositional candidate running in the elections made it into the Parliament.

According to the official results of the 29th of September based on 100 out of the 110 constituencies, not one of the opposition candidates managed to gain a seat in parliament. According to Lidziya Yarmoshyna, chairwoman of the Central Election Commission, these include the leader of the opposition United Civic Party Anatol Lyabedzka who received 9.7% of votes; Ihar Rynkevich from the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Hramada) – 15%; Siarhei Kalyakin, the leader of the Party of Communists - 15.6%; Volha Kozulina - 8.6%; Ales Mikhalevich – 14% etc. Instead, many current MPs were re-elected as deputies to the House of Representatives with the addition of many local officials who also won seats.

According to a preliminary OSCE press release, despite some recent positive developments – e.g. slightly increased access of opposition representatives to election commissions; re-broadcasting the candidates’ five-minute spots during prime-time; progress in the candidates’ ability to conduct meetings in authorized locations without interference - the elections did not adhere to the optimistic expectations.

In fact, as the press release reads, “despite some minor improvements, the […] parliamentary elections in Belarus ultimately fell short of OSCE commitments for democratic elections”. The voting itself was relatively well conducted, but it is during the vote count that the problems emerged. OSCE monitors were prevented or hindered from observing the vote count in 35 per cent of cases, which compromised the transparency of that fundamental element of the election process. According to Anne-marie Lizin, Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Special Co-ordinator of the OSCE short-term observers: "the clear signals to improve the election process were not implemented and substantial improvements are required if Belarus is to conduct genuinely democratic elections in line with our common OSCE commitments. Unfortunately the repeated signals of good will did not seem to have been correctly given or received. Consequently the significant progress we hoped for in the democratic development of Belarus did not materialize."

The elections were accompanied and followed by mass protests in the October Square in central Minsk. Several thousands gathered there in the mornings of September 28th and 29th to protest against the falsifications and call on new elections.

Local elections 14 January 2007
On 14 January 2007 local elections were held in Belarus. Like the preceding elections, these elections could not meet the international standards for free and fair elections, as set by the OSCE. Belarusian authorities stated that approx. 79% of the eligible voters went to the polling stations to vote. The unfair elections were heavily condemned by both the UN and the EU.

EU-Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated the following about the local elections: “Restrictive rules on campaigning, as well as intimidation of candidates from the democratic opposition meant that freedom of expression, association and assembly were seriously undermined. These elections therefore failed to give Belarusian voters a genuine choice.”

In total, 22639 local deputies were elected, of which only 11 were from opposition parties.

Presidential elections 19 March 2006
The presidential elections are the most important elections in Belarus, as the state has turned into a strong authoritarian presidential republic. Long before the actual election day on 19 March 2006 it was clear these elections would take place in a repressive climate, thus preventing a free and fair campaign for the opposition candidates.

First of all, international organisations and the democratic opposition have challenged the legitimacy of the candidacy of incumbent President Lukashenka. Lukashenka arranged the possibility to run for a third tem in a flawed referendum (2004) which changed the constitution and opened the way for a third term. The trick of changing the constitution had been used earlier to extend his first term to 2001, instead of 1999.

Second blow into the face of the opposition was the announcement of the date. Originally, elections were expected to be held in July. In December Lukashenka announced the election date to be 19 March. This shocked the opposition as they would have very little time left to prepare themselves and get the message of their existence out to the people.

The opposition until the presidential elections 2006
A major step in the consolidation of the democratic forces was taken on 1-2 October, when Alyaksandr Milinkevich was elected the opposition “single candidate”. He won 399 votes at the Congress of Democratic Forces of Belarus, which unexpectedly was allowed to take place in Minsk. His main challenger Anatol Lyabedzka, leader of the liberal United Civic Party, collected 391 votes. The participants of the Congress represented the majority of oppositional parties and public associations of Belarus. Alyaksandr Milinkevich – coming from the NGO sector - was seen as the best possible candidate as he had clean hands in the political scene, which has been plagued by internal conflicts for many years. Also he appeared to be balanced enough to unite a wide range of political colours, including nationalists, liberals, social democrats (not all) as well as communists.

Milinkevich formed his campaign team, giving key positions to the political leaders in his coalition. The united coalition brought together three opposition coalitions: the Coalition Five Plus (Belarusian Popular Front, United Civic Party, Belarusian Party of Communist), Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada led by Stanislav Shushkevich, the Greens, the liquidated Belarus Labour Party and a significant number of NGOs), the European Coalition (Belarusian Social Democratic Party “Narodnaya Hramada” led by imprisoned (until 22 May 2007) Mikola Statkevich; the Party of Women of Belarus "Nadzeya", non-registered Party of Freedom and Progress, and non-registered NGO "Young Front") and the Council of Civil Initiatives/ “Free Belarus” (NGO "Charter-97" and non-registered civic movement "Zubr").

Besides President Lukashenka and opposition leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich, two more candidates managed to register as a candidate for the March presidential elections: pro-government lawmaker Syarhey Haydukevich and opposition figure Alyaksandr Kazulin.

Kazulin’s candidacy is controversial in opposition circles. As the rector of the Belarusian State University (until November 2003) he was responsible for the expulsion of students who engaged in opposition activities. In 2005 he re-appeared in public as the leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H), a split from the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada (BSDP NH), led by Mikola Statkevich. The fact that the BSDP H went to the Ministry of Justice beginning of 2005 to claim the name of the party, did raise serious criticism in the international social democratic movement.

Rumours about Kazulin’s connections with the Kremlin and the Lukashenka regime cannot be proofed though, and it seems that he is backed by a substantial amount of people, including youth - who say that Kazulin claimed to unite the left. Indeed, Kazulin profiled himself as a left wing candidate initially opposing the “liberal candidate” Milinkevich, whom he accused of only being interested in foreign money. Many deplored Kazulin’s candidacy as it would raise confusion among the voters and split the democratic vote.

The campaign
Observers and international donors usually divided the pre-election campaign in Belarus in two parts: the political process (Milinkevich’s campaign) and the civic campaigns. However, in practice the campaigns were often connected, which is not surprisingly, knowing that the main opposition candidate for the presidential elections comes from the NGO scene.

The best example of connectivity of the civic and political campaign is the Solidarity/Jeans campaign initiated by “We Remember”, “Charter 97” and Zubr. Their attempt to create solidarity with the disappeared people was openly supported by Alyaksandr Milinkevich. The activists were burning candles and holding rallies every 16th of the month. The jeans symbol for freedom was introduced after an activist, Nikita Sasim, was beaten up in September 2005 for waving the traditional white-red-white flag. In response, he took off his denim shirt and used it as a flag. The Day of Solidarity became also internationally known; resulting in rallies in several European and American cities every 16th of the month.

The political campaign was highly biased in favour of President Lukashenka. Characteristic was the media reports after the election of Alyaksandr Milinkevich as the united opposition candidate in October. Reports showed men dressed up as women and gays in front of the building where the Congress took place. Suggestions that the opposition is made up of homosexuals (something considered unacceptable for many people in Belarus) were more often heard as Lukashenka pointed out that the colour of the opposition – blue (jeans) – is the colour of gays.

Remarkable is the fact that Milinkevich, starting with zero support, managed to reach 18,1% support in December 2005 (according to public opinion poll data released by the Independent Institute for Political, Social and Economic Studies). The first increase was shown after the above-mentioned televised reports of the Congress. The International Republican Institute explained that even Black PR caused an increase of support, as this was simply the first time many Belarusian people heard of the existence of an alternative to Lukashenka. After this “incident” the media remained mostly silent about the opposition.

The opposition remained deprived from access to mass media. In September 2005, Narodnaya Volya, the main opposition newspaper with the biggest circulation was denied distribution by the state-run monopoly after a court froze the newspaper’s assets. In November 2005, Belarus's state postal service excluded the newspaper from its 2006 subscription catalogue. Since October the newspaper has been published in Smolensk across the border in Russia, “only” facing the risk of confiscation once entering the country. “Narodnaya Volya” is just one example; many independent newspapers faced the same kind of repressive measures in the run up to the elections, and before.

Candidates for the presidential elections were given half an hour airtime twice on television, which were censored by the authorities. On 22 February. Alyaksandr Milinkevich, pledged to radically change the style of governance and free his country from the grip of fear. Milinkevich said the opposition is against staging a "coloured revolution" in Belarus, but added that if the authorities rig the election, people will have the right to demonstrate. Presidential candidate Alyaksandr Kazulin, said incumbent President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has no right to be on the ballot for the 19 March presidential election, because it is a violation of the constitution. Also he insulted Lukashenka accusing him of having a mistress and personally profiting from weapon sales.

As access to media was limited the campaign focused on grassroots activities: going from door to door and meeting people in the street or gatherings in cinema’s and squares. By doing so opposition as usual had to encounter a lot of “administrative repression”, e.g. minutes before a meeting the venue is not allowed to be used because of fire regulations or police that halts cars because they suspect it to be stolen etc.

Observers noted a “psychological breakthrough” on 2 March, when 3 to 10 thousand people gathered for a meeting with Alyaksandr Milinkevich. This was the first time a substantial amount of people openly showed their support for the opposition, which is courageous as they took the risk of being detained or fired from their job.

The electorate 
Polls of the International Republican Institute showed that about 45 percent of the respondents found that another President should replace Lukashenka and 32 percent of the voters were floating (September 2005). According to their research this undecided third found low incomes and low living standards the biggest problem of the country.

However, other figures from the same institute show that the percentage of people who think Belarus “is on the right track” increased from just over 30 percent in 2001 to about 60 percent in 2005. In November 2005 half of the respondents described the situation in their country as “not bad but could be better”. Fact is that President Lukashenka is able to pay the pensions and keep the system running. This in combination with media reporting about chaos abroad and the lack of a visible attractive alternative cause that a substantial part of the electorate sees stability as a major asset of the Lukashenka regime.

The core supporters of Lukashenka are relatively old (55plus), have a low level of education, are mostly pensioners or working in state-run companies, and live in rural areas and smaller towns. The general profile of people who support democratic change in Belarus is: 18-35 years old, highly educated, student, self-employed or working in a private company and living in bigger cities, mostly concentrated in the capital Minsk. The persuadable people are 30-50 years old, have secondary and sometimes higher education, are employed in state owned firms, or are unemployed or housekeeper. These people are not concentrated in a certain area (IRI, 2005).

Climate of intimidation 
Another repressive measure in the run up to the 19 March presidential elections was the amendment of the Criminal Code in December. This amendment criminalized discrediting of the Republic of Belarus, including “transmitting to a foreign state, or an international or foreign organization blatantly deceitful information about the political, economic, social, military or international situation of Belarus”. Also activities of unregistered organizations were forbidden. People breaking this law risk long terms of imprisonment.

The new law seems a reaction of President Lukashenka out of fear for an Ukrainian style revolution. He accused Western nations of seeking to interfere in the country's internal affairs and Belarusian officials labelled foreign organizations as terrorist. The President urged police to work "pre-emptively" to ensure stability ahead of the 19 March vote.

Just before the elections on 16 March, Stepan Sukhorenko, head of the KGB secret service, accused the opposition of planning to stage a coup. He warned the opposition that whoever would go out on the street to “try to destabilise the situation, their actions will be qualified as terrorism" a crime, he added, that can result in life in prison or the death penalty.

In the days before the elections a wave of detentions, including leading activist and campaigners of the Milinkevich team, was reported. According to opposition source around 300 activists have been detained or harassed and over 50 were sentenced to temporarily imprisonment mostly on charges of swearing, littering and hooliganism. On 2 March opposition candidate Alyaksandr Kazulin was beaten up and shortly detained.

These threats and restrictive measures, created a climate of fear and intimidation. The conclusion of the secretary general of the Council of Europe just before the elections was shared by many: “Whatever the outcome, these elections cannot be qualified as democratic in any meaning of the word”.

Election day(s) and aftermath
According to the OSCE 31 percent of the voters cast their ballot during the five day early voting, which started on 14 March. Early voting is a problem because it is not transparent and there were reports of employers and teachers who forced employees and students to vote early, threatening them with penalties.

Opposition members were not represented in the Central Election Committee (CEC), and international observers noted many problems during the vote counting. While the CEC presented on Sunday evening the early results, opposition gathered on October Square in Minsk to protest the falsified elections.

Official results 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka 82,6%
Alyaksandr Milinkevich 6%
Syarhey Haydukevich 3,5%
Alyaksandr Kazulin 2,3%

According to the CEC turnout reached 92,6%.

Starting on the evening after the closing of the polls, people gathered on October Square. Estimations range from 10.000 to 40.000 participants. Reports mentioned an enthusiastic atmosphere. Police stayed off the square. In the days after the elections activists tried to imitate the Ukraine-style tent camps. However, the numbers declined and people in the vicinity of the square were detained. In the night of 24 March riot police removed the activists by force from the square and arrested an estimated 400 people. The detained activists were deported to an unknown location and according to opposition sources gas was used inside the trucks that took them away.

On 25 March, which opposition also marked independence day (Belarus was shortly independent on 25 March 1918, after World War I; official independence day however is 3 July – in remembrance of the date Minsk was liberated by Russians from German troops in 1944) the protests were ended. As by 2007, the oppositional protests have not been of the magnitude of March 2006. However, protests are still in practice. On 14 October 2006 the so-called “European March” will be held in Belarusian capital of Minsk. According to Milinkevich “this will be the March for the future free and European Belarus. It will be the beginning of our road to free and united Europe”.

International response 
The OSCE, which monitored the elections with 439 short-term observers, concluded, “the election failed to meet OSCE commitments for democratic elections, despite the fact that voters were offered the potential for a genuine choice between four candidates”. Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Head of the Long-term Observation Mission deployed by the OSCE/ODIHR, said: "It was deeply saddening to witness the deterioration that occurred towards the end of the election campaign. A positive assessment of this election was impossible."

On behalf of the EU Presidency, Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik said that the conduct of the vote was "far beyond acceptable." Calling for sanctions against Minsk, the President of the European Parliament, Josep Borrell, said that the elections were "flawed by a high number of irregularities, instances of violence and arbitrary arrests," and he called upon the Council to "take the criticisms voiced by Parliament fully into consideration when it decides on sanctions against the Belarusian government."

The United States – not accepting the results - called for new elections. In contrast, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Lukashenka on his "convincing victory". Commenting on the Western reactions, Lukashenka said that he was "not afraid of further isolation”.

 

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IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES

Human rights
Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the lack of pluralist democracy brought Belarus in an isolated position. According to several reports, including those of the Council of Europe and Amnesty International Belarus, human rights violations include lack of freedom of expression and freedom of association. Human rights defenders and opposition activists are subject to intimidation, harassment, and risk to be beaten up and/ or arrested by the police.

The last remaining national human rights organisation, the Belarusian Helsinki Association (BHC), is threatened with closure. On 1 March 2006, c, the chair of the BHC was accused of tax evasion and the organization faces a potential fine of ,000 and probable closure. The case lasted throughout the year. On 1 November 2006, the Minsk Economic Court decided to confiscate 8,300 worth of property and on 19 December 2006, the presidential administration informed the organisation that they must vacate their office premises by 20 January 2007. Without an official address, the organisation would become illegal in Belarus.

The most well known political prisoner in Belarus is Alyaksandr Kazulin, leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H). On 25 March 2006, a week after the presidential election, Kazulin was arrested. He was charged with violation of the Belarusian Criminal Code: Part 2 of Article 339, hooliganism, and Article 342, the organization of group actions, crudely breaking public order and disobedience to legal requirements of the authorities or causing a break out in functioning of the transport, any enterprise, institution or organization, or active participation in such actions. Kazulin was found guilty and sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment. On 20 October Kazulin went on a hunger strike to protest against lawlessness in Belarus caused by the illegitimate president. His health deteriorated and after 54 days he ended the hunger strike.

Another well known political prisoner, Mikola Statkevich, leader of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada (BSDP NH) was released on 22 May 2007 after more than two years of imprisonment. On 1 May 2005 Statkevich was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for organising mass protest rallies against rigged results of the parliamentary election vote and referendum in 2004 (Article 342 of the Criminal Code - organizing of group actions violating public order, or active participation in them). He served his sentence, which was shortened with one year later, in a corrective labour camp. Statkevich was released together with the leader of the opposition youth, Paval Sevyarynets. In September 2007, Sevyarynets was sentenced again to 17 days in jail. This time Sevyarynets, who several days before had left the Brest remand prison after 15 nights arrest for his book presentation, was admitted guilty of resisting the militia, of organising unsanctioned actions and minor disorderly conduct.

In their report of 2007, Amnesty International reports that the civil society in Belarus deteriorates with great speed. Non-governmental organisations face high levels of state-control on their activities. Under the article 193 of the criminal code, organisations risk a sentence up to three years for “organising and running an unregistered organisation that infringes the rights of citizens.”

In 2008 the situation did not improve. For instance, on 22 April 2008 10 young activists were tried for participating in a peaceful march on 10 January of the same year, in which thousands of entrepreneurs marched in protest of presidential decree 760 on regulation of entrepreneurial activities. As a result of the trials the leader of Vitebsk entrepreneurs Siarhei Parsiukevich was sentenced to 2.5 years imprisonment and youth activist Andrei Kim was sentenced to 1.5 years of imprisonment under article 364: violence or threat of violence towards policemen. In addition, at least two others were fined and at least 7 other participants of the march were sentenced to two years of personal restraint without direction to open penitentiary institutions.

On March 23rd, about 20 people with white and red balloons walked around the places related to the life of Paluta Badunova, minister of the Belarusian Democratic Republic. The police videotaped the tour, and drew up reports against 8 people for violation of the order of organizing mass events. Many were detained by police, after which four received sentences varying from 7 to 15 days in jail, while others were fined.

On 2 May Mikola Statkevich was sentenced to 10 days imprisonment for a Labour Day action on the previous day. According to the police he was detained for ‘waving a blue with yellow stars flag, [and calling] through a megaphone to join the European Union, thus violating article 23.34 of the Administrative Code’ (i.e. violating the rules of organizing and holding mass actions). Along with Statkevich, approximately 30 activists were detained.

On 4 June the chairman of the Memorial branch of the Belarusian Voluntary Society of History and Culture Monuments Protection Viachaslau Siwchyk was sentenced to to 10 days of administrative arrest for violation of article 23.34 of the Administrative Code (violation of the order of staging and carrying out mass events or picketing) for announcing of the results of the competition held by the Belarusian service of RFE/RL (My picture – My Kurapaty) in Kurapaty forest on 3 June.

A bomb explosion on the 4th of July Independence Day celebrations that resulted in 54 injured, was followed by another wave of searches, interrogations and 13 arrests of opposition activists, while 79% of the Belarus population believed the authorities were behind the blast. In the aftermath of the explosion, Lukashenka sacked his chief of staff Gennady Nevyglas and Viktor Sheyman, the head of the security council after harshly criticising their handling of the situation. Former KGB chief Yury Zhadobin has been appointed as head of the Security Council and Uladzimir Matei was appointed chief of staff. Interestingly, both men are seen as confidants of president Lukashenka’s son, Viktar Lukashenka. This could point towards the possibility of a gradual preparation of Viktar (currently member of the Security Council) to assume a bigger role in the government; perhaps even preparing him for presidential heirdom.

Disappearances
In 1999, three of Lukashenka’s most powerful opponents disappeared. The disappearance of former interior minister, Yuri Zakharenko, former vice-president Viktor Gonchar and his friend Anatoly Krasovsky was followed by that of television journalist Dmitry Zavadsky in 2000.

After much pressure from the opposition parties an investigation was finally initiated in 2001, but this did not lead to any official results. The responsible investigators, who had fled the country and received political asylum in the Unites States, concluded that a secret dead squad, orchestrated by government officials Viktar Sheyman and Yuri Sivakou, was behind the disappearances. Lukashenka reacted to these accusations by disdaining them as opposition slander in the campaign for the presidential elections.

In 2003 a new investigation was started after the wives of Gonchar and Krasovsky uttered their complains to the Procurer General. However, this new investigation did not lead to further results.

In April 2005 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) issued a resolution on "disappearances" in Belarus calling for an impartial investigation into the disappearances in 1999-2000 and asking for prominent officials who were implicated to be suspended.

State Ideology
Lukashenka started a new pro-independence rhetoric in 2003, instigated by the disappointing results in the process of unifications with Russia. The new ‘state ideology’ was first revealed in March 2003 and has the purpose to act as an ‘immune system’, protecting the state from internal and external subversion. The ideology seems contradicting in the way it incorporates Marxism, liberalism and conservatism at once. Analysts have described it as a reactionary version of Soviet conservatism.

The project of implementing the state ideology has already had its influence on the educational system. Schools are now obliged to employ an official, full-time ideological worker.

Although the new ideology has a very nationalistic nature, Lukashenka has initiated a process of linguistic Russification. The issue of the Belarusian language has become highly politicised as most of the opposition parties are against Lukashenka’s project of Russification and favour the Belarusian. In this political struggle, the Belarusian language has evolved into a symbol of opposition.

The president has therefore pressured state television to stop broadcasting in the Belarusian language and forced the last school that taught the Belarusian language to close down. How the Russification will continue now the gas-conflict of 2007 has affected the relationship between Russia and Belarus, remains to be seen.

Economy
Official figures on the economy speak of economic growth in the last couple of years. According to the CIA Worldfactbook Belarus’s economy grew in 2006 with 9,9% (2006 est.) The state employs over 90% of the people, providing practically full employment. Wages are low, but paid predictably and on time. Observes say that Lukashenka is able to keep this “market socialism” system running because of cheap Russian oil and gas, which he sells for market prices to EU countries.

However, living standards have not improved and poverty remains high, even by Belarus national standards. The CIA World Fact book states that 27,1% of the Belarusian population (2003 est.) lives below the poverty-line. High levels of social support have been a defining policy of the economic model and have been an important factor determining the government popularity. A large part of families’ utility costs for example were paid by the state. However, this system has proven not to be as efficient as planned, with subsidies that did not reach the poorest layers of the population.

In 2002 the government implemented cutbacks on social subsidies. Paid services were introduced in health care and education, showing a trend towards cost-based prices. Some economists suggested that this is the first sign, which indicates that Lukashenka is unable to maintain his economic system.

Others say it was part of the strategy for presidential support. By keeping the living standards low, the Belarusian people respond well to small increases in wages. The president announces these increases like they are little presents to the people.

Relations with the European Union
A good working relation between EU and Belarus has never developed, even though they are of large interest to one another, not the least because Belarus has important energy transport systems on its grounds.

The relations have been cool since Lukashenka took up his presidency in 1994. In 2002, the relations deteriorated as Belarus expelled all observers from the OSCE. In response to the expulsion, 14 European Union members decided to impose a travel ban on the president and seven top officials. Only after fruitful negotiations of OSCE-chairman Portugal, the OSCE was able to return with an adapted mandate and the presidents travel ban was cancelled.

In February 2003, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly granted the National Assembly of Belarus a seat and the EU lifted its travel ban on Lukashenka in November. The 2006 presidential elections were also considered to be “severely flawed” by the EU and the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Report. Despite repeated calls for an observance of international standards by the European Council in the run up to the elections in March 2006, the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission reported an arbitrary use of state power, obviously designed to protect the incumbent president. The EU condemned both the elections that were not held in a free or fair manner, and the violence used by the Belarusian authorities against demonstrators and members of the opposition. To this end, restrictive measures have been adopted against President Lukashenka, the Belarusian leadership and officials responsible for the violations of international electoral standards. These individuals are subject to a visa ban and an asset freeze, however such measures are not intended to have a negative impact on the Belarusian population. The list of those affected by the ban is under constant review.

The European Commission’s European Neighbourhood Policy envisions closer links with those neighbours willing to share the European values and respect its vital interests. As part of this strategy the EU will develop relations with Ukraine, Moldova and some Mediterranean countries. Belarus is not one of those countries. Although the EU has made clear that it would very much like to see a more developed relationship with Belarus, this relationship will be out of the question as long as there is no improvement in the human rights situation.

The EU is involved in several programmes supporting the opposition in Belarus. The most recent initiative is a EU-funded radio station, which started broadcasting February 2006 into Belarus to offer Belarusian independent news. This initiative is part of a wider two million Euro package of measures by the EU to support Belarusian journalists and promote an independent media in the country. Another, Polish-funded, radio station, Radio Racija, began broadcasting into Belarus also in February 2006.

November 2006 the European Commission presented a new strategy of relations with Belarus, offering that country's government significant economic incentives in exchange for fulfilling 12 conditions on the path toward democratisation. Opposition leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich has welcomed the EU's offer of a new strategy toward Belarus. "[Official] propagandists are constantly telling Belarusians that they cannot count on the EU, as they say we're not welcome in Europe. And here we get a document that confirms that the EU is waiting for Belarus, is waiting for democratic changes in our country.... This strategy can prove very helpful for fighting the apathy that has gripped Belarusian society," Milinkevich said.

In September 2007, Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Voronetski visited the European Neighbourhood Policy meeting in Brussels. During this meeting, Voronetski criticised the European Neighbourhood Policy and the European sanctions against Belarus by stating: "What will not help these goals -- the consolidation and strengthening of a 'Great Europe' -- is measures aimed in the opposite direction, aimed at creating new artificial barriers: customs, visa, and other types of restrictions creating obstacles for the extension of contacts between governments, business circles, and the peoples of our countries."

In March 2008 the government of Belarus and the European Commission in Brussels signed an agreement on the opening, the privileges and the immunity of the European Commission's Representative Office in Minsk. However, despite the warming of relations between the EU and Belarus no real progress towards democracy can be observed after the already discussed recent political convictions.

Relations with the United States 
For a long time, the United States have chosen for a policy of isolation of Belarus. A major part of the American support has gone to nationalist opposition party BPF. When this party turned out to be unsuccessful in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1998 and 2001, the US changed its policy and started focusing on a larger number of parties, just like the EU does.

In 2004 the United States Congress approved the ‘Belarus Democracy act’. This act was designed to promote democratic development, human rights, and the rule of law in Belarus, as well as encourage the consolidation and strengthening of Belarus’ sovereignty and independence. The bill authorises necessary assistance for supporting Belarusian political parties and nongovernmental organisations, independent media, and international exchanges. The determination of the volume of this support is left to the U.S. president.

The document also prohibits all agencies of the U.S. government to provide loans and investment to the Belarusian government. Furthermore the act will make sure reports on weapon trade to and from Belarus and on the personal wealth of Lukashenka are made on a yearly basis.

In January 2005, Condoleezza Rice named the nations of Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Burma, North Korea, and Zimbabwe as "outposts of tyranny."

The relationship between the two countries could possibly improve a little when the Belarusian government decides in 2008 to link the Belarusian currency to the US dollar, unlinking it with the Russian ruble. The decision to link the currency with the US dollar is explained by Belarusian officials as a search for monetary stability. However, analysts state that Lukashenka’s decision is fed by the Belarus’ dissatisfaction about the Russia-Belarus gas-dispute (see below). The creation of a Belarus-Russia monetary-union is more unlikely than ever, anno 2007 (see below)

Relations with Russia
The Belarusian culture and language hold strong ties with the Russian culture and in the short period of Belarus’ independence, this has led to a more or less absence of a distinct Belarusian cultural identity. Under Lukashenka, the drive towards Russia has increased and several agreements on economic cooperation have been signed since April 1994. One of the first moves was to make a free trade agreement between the two countries in 1995.

Observers consider that former president Yeltsin went along to appease his nationalist and communist voters. Duma members regarded Belarus as a safe area between Russia and the “evil forces of the West” and had a vision of a restored “Russian empire”. For the Russian investors the state-owned enterprises that may be privatised on a short-term basis are another interesting aspect of unification.

For Lukashenka the integration was a matter of personal political ambition to extend his influence. Unfortunately for Lukashenka, president Putin has taken a more pragmatic approach to the subject lately. He sees Belarus as the minor player in the union negotiations.

In 2002 Putin suggested a model for unification, with Belarus’ six regions having the same rights as the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation. Lukashenka called Putin’s unification plan unacceptable; the Belarusian voters would never vote to totally eliminate their country’s sovereignty. A bilateral working group presented a draft constitution in 2003, but neither one of the countries has ratified this.

The official agreement was to create a monetary union between the two countries on 1 January 2005, leading to the creation of a single currency in 2008, but the countries were not ready for that. In August 2004, Putin announced a delay of at least one year, referring to the fact that both countries were ‘politically unprepared’. The establishment of a constitution for the union continues to be problematic. Differences on tax policy, customs codes, foreign trade, and constitutional issues keep returning.

The main problem for the proposed union is however that Lukashenka is not planning to surrender any of his sovereignty to Russia. Realising this would be necessary; Lukashenka changed his position towards Russia and profiles himself as a defender of Belarusian independence from both its western and eastern neighbours.

There remains, however, on issue that has caused many problems between Lukashenka and Putin over the last few years: gas. Already in 2004, the first disputes over gas-prices started between Minsk and Moscow. Under a contract signed on 31 December 2006 between the Belarusian government and the Russian state-controlled gas monopolist Gazprom, Belarus has to pay 0 per 1,000 cubic meters of Russian gas in 2007, compared with .68 during the previous 2 1/2 years.

Gazprom allowed Minsk to pay 55% of the contract price in the first six months of 2007. Minsk promised to pay off the accumulated gas debt by 23 July but failed to do so. Belarus's debt to Gazprom now stands at 6 million. Russia threatened to reduce its gas supply with 45%, reflecting the level of payment for Russian gas by Belarus this year.

 

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POLITICAL PARTIES

The Belarus party-apparatus is underdeveloped. Most parties are organised from the top down, having weak linkages to the society and a low membership base. The results of the parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2004 show a tendency of declining representation of political parties and an increasing number of non-partisan parliamentarians. Moreover, the parliament itself hardly has any power and mostly serves to mask the reality of dictatorship.

The oppositional parties, not represented in the parliament, are often internally divided and have to cope with all sorts of governmental hinder. Their bases of support are generally urban-oriented, while over 60 percent of the Belarus population lives on the countryside.

 

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SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

 Belarusian Social Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada (BSDP NH)
The BSDP NH calls itself the successor of the Belarusian Socialist Hramada, which was founded in 1903. The Belarusian Socialist Hramada played a crucial role in the formation of the short-lived Belarusian People's Republic in 1918. The party was re-established in March 1991. Since then it has been plagued by internal conflicts. Mikola Statkevich chairs the party since 1995 and has been arrested several times for his actions against the Lukashenka government.

The BSDP-NH demands a democratic, legal, and social state, and favours European Council and European Union membership for Belarus. One of the party’s priorities traditionally is the defense and the revival of national values. Today, the BSDP NH programme wants to adapt ’classical values of European Social Democracy’ to Belarusian standards. It wants a social market economy and privatisation of small and medium businesses, but wants to keep railways and utilities in government hands. According to the BSDP-NH, the medical care, the pension system, and education need to be reformed on a step-by-step basis.

The party used to be a member of the Consultative Council of Parties, but under the leadership of Mikola Statkevich left the council when it decided to participate in the 2000 elections, while other opposition parties organised a boycott. In 2003 the BDSP-NH became the leading party of the European Coalition “Free Belarus”. General Frolov, one of the leading figures of the “Respublika” fraction, joined the BDSP NH in 2004.

The BSDP NH has gone through some major changes in 2005. Internal conflicts led to a split in the party. The vice-chairmen of the party - Vladimir Nistyuk, Vitaly Malashko and Yury Markovsky accused party leader Statkevich of acting in violation of the party’s charter and holding separate talks on the creation of a united social democratic party. They went to the Ministry of Justice, to get support for their act and Mr. Nistyuk, was appointed as interim chairman of the party which also claims to be the one and only rightful BSDP.

Mikola Statkevich, considered the congress a provocation against the party. According to Statkevich, who was supported by leaders of regional committees of the BSDP as well as international partners, this is a move of Lukashenka and his allies to undermine the social democratic movement and democracy in general. In reaction to the decision of the Belarusian Ministry of Justice on the party chairmanship, the IX Congress of the BSDP NH took place on 26 February 2005.

The adopted resolution "On the European Political Course of the Party" says: "The main goal of the government’s provocation is to change the pro-European course of the party and to prohibit from the presidential election participation a candidate, who is able to inspire and head mass actions of protest the regime is so afraid of". The Congress expressed its support to the actions of the party leadership directed at unification of all left-centric forces in Belarus into one social-democratic party. The Congress also re-elected Mikola Statkevich as the party chairman (97 for, 4 against) and as a candidate for the presidential election 2006. The following persons have been elected for the party leadership: Head of the Central Revision Commission: Mikola Kijko, First vice-chairman: Ales Arestovich, Vice-chairmen: Oksana Bernazkaya and Sergej Romanko. The new international secretary of the party is Olga Stuzhinskaya.

On 22 March 2005 a formal charge has been brought against BSDP NH party leader Mikola Statkevich over the street protests that were sparked by the internationally criticized 2004 parliamentary elections and referendum. The criminal proceedings were instituted under the Criminal Code’s Article 342 that carries punishment for “the organization of group actions disturbing public peace or active participation in them.” Mr. Statkevich was sentenced to three years in corrective labour camp. Later, this was reduced to two years. Statkevich was released on 22 May 2007.

Since the split of the party, the party is without registration and office, which makes it hard to operate effectively. The party participated in the Congress of United Democratic Forces in October 2005 and supported the candidacy of Alyaksandr Milinkevich during the 2006 presidential election.

The BSDP-NH has a consultative status with the SI.

Leader: Mikola Statkevich
www.bsdpng.info/index.php

 

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Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H)
The BSDP H was founded after the split of the BSDP NH (above). On 15 January 2005 this BSDP, at that time still claiming the name BSDP NH, appointed Anatol Levkovich as new leader of the party. The new six vice-chairmen are Nistyuk, Malashko, Markovski, Marina Azaryonok, Konstantin Moroz and Nikolaj Kanakh. The party claims to have unified with the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada (BSDH). This would only include the people around former BSDH prominent Aleksei Korol, because the leader of de BSDH, Stanislav Sushkevich, says the unification process was held to create an imitated social democratic party.

On 10 April the name of the party changed into Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H) and Alyaksandr Kazulin, a former rector of Belarusian State University, became the leader the party. Alyaksandr Kazulin ran as a candidate in the 2006 presidential election alongside united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich.

Kazulin’s appearance aroused a wide range of reactions in opposition circles, from enthusiasm to suspicion. In his function as rector of the Berlarusian State University, until 2003, he was responsible for suspension of students for engaging in opposition activities, and he used to serve as a vice-minister in the government. However, in the run up to the 2006 presidential election he turned out to be an outspoken critic of President Lukashenka. He was beaten up by the police and briefly detained after attempting to enter the All Berlarusian People’s Assembly.

On 25 March 2006, a week after the presidential election, Kazulin was arrested. He was charged with violation of the Belarusian Criminal Code: Part 2 of Article 339, hooliganism, and Article 342, the organisation of group actions, crudely breaking public order and disobedience to legal requirements of the authorities or causing a break out in functioning of the transport, any enterprise, institution or organisation, or active participation in such actions. Kazulin was found guilty and sentenced to five and a half years of imprisonment.

On 20 October Kazulin went on a hunger strike to protest against lawlessness in Belarus caused by the illegitimate president. His health deteriorated and after 54 days he ended the hunger strike.

In November 2006 the party signed a document declaring the intention to form an alliance of left-wing parties with the Belarusian Party of Communists led by Sergey Kaliakin, and the Belarusian Women's Party "Nadzeya" led by Yelena Yeskova. Anatol Levkovich, acting head of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada (BSDP H), called on the parties to jointly struggle for the release of Aleksandr Kazulin. He said that the alliance was not being formed in opposition to the coalition of united pro-democratic forces. He said that it the alliance is open to all political groups sharing social democratic values.

In 2007, the acting head of the BSDP H, Anatol Leykovich, was elected as one of the four rotational leaders of the Democratic Forces in Belarus.

The BSDP H actively seeks support of social democrats in Western Europe.

Leader: Alyaksandr Kazulin (while Kazulin is imprisoned, Anatol Levkovich acts as party-leader)
www.bsdp.org

 

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Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada (BSD H) The party was founded in 1998 and is led by Stanislav Shushkevich, who is relatively well known as from 1991 to 1994 he was the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. In this capacity, in 1991, together with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk he signed the declaration that officially dissolved the Soviet Union (Belavezha Agreement). In the first presidential election in 1994, Shushkevich stood as a candidate, but was defeated by current president Lukashenka.

The party was a member of the Five Plus coalition and supported the candidacy of united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich in the 2006 election. The social democratic faction led by Aleksei Korol left the party and joined the party led by Kazulin. The party is in favour of an independent Belarus that is no colony of Russia, but also not a member of NATO and the EU.
Leader: Stanislav Shushkevich

Other leftist parties that are often invited to international social democratic events are: Belarusian Party of Labour and Belarusian Party of Communists (see below).

 

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OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES

 United Civil Party (UCP) 
The party was established in 1995 as a result of a merger of two like-minded parties - United Democratic Party (formed in 1990) and Civil Party (formed in 1994). According to the party’s statutes, it has a liberal conservative orientation that places the individual’s rights above the interests of social groups, the state or the nation. The main pillars are human rights, an open society, a democratic form of government, the rule of law, the right of personal property and of free entrepreneurship. Belarus’ membership of the EU is one of the party’s goals. The party used to be part of the Five Plus coalition.

Party leader Anatal Lyabedzka narrowly lost the vote from Alyaksandr Milinkevich during the congress of democratic forces in October 2005, when the united opposition candidate for the presidential elections was chosen. In May 2006 Anatol Lyabedzka was re-elected chairman. During his speech on this occasion, which appealed for another democratic congress, he declared that the supporters of jailed presidential candidate Alexander Kazulin should also be invited as well as participants from the October Square tent camp. His party's priorities for the future, he stated, would embrace a campaign to release political detainees as well as an international public tribunal for the Lukashenka regime.

In 2007, Anatol Lyabedzka became one of the four rotational leaders of the Democratic Forces in Belarus.

Leader: Anatol Lyabedzka
www.ucpb.org

 

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Belarusian Popular Front ‘Adradzhennie’ (BPF)
The organisational committee of the BPF was established in October 1988 by a group of intellectuals and was the first alternative to the Communist Party in Belarus. The BPF has a nationalist conservative orientation and favours democracy and independence through national rebirth and rebirth of civil society, which was destroyed by communism and foreign occupation. The BPF is fighting for the development of Belarus as an independent, democratic, neutral state, which has good relations with all nations. The party is against the unification with Russia.

In 1999 at the party congress internal divisions between then leader Zyanon Paznyak (currenlty living in Poland) and Valyantsin Vyachorka resulted in a split. Mr. Paznyak then advocated there should be two organizations: a public association under Mr. Vyachorka and a political party - the Conservative Christian Party of the BPF under his leadership. Mr. Vyachorka rejected this idea and Mr. Vyachorka was elected as the new leader.

The BPF was part of the Five Plus coalition and supported the united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich during the 2006 presidential election. Two weeks before the election party leader Vyachorka, who played a key role in the campaign, was jailed for two weeks for organising an unauthorised rally.

In 2007, the head of the BPF, Valyantsin Vyachorka, was elected as one of the four rotational leaders of the Democratic Forces in Belarus.

Leader: Valyantsin Vyachorka
www.pbnf.org

 

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Belarusian Party of Communists
The party was founded in 1991 as the successor of the Communist Part of Belarus (CPB), the ruling party in Belarus. The Belarusian Party of Communists is in opposition and co-exists with the pro-government Communist Party of Belarus.

BPC participated in negotiations between political opposition and authorities and joined the Consultation Council of Opposition. The party is in favour of eliminating the authoritarian regime. It does, however, agree with Lukashenka on the union of Belarus with Russia.

The party was part of the Five Plus coalition and supported united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich in the run up to the 2006 presidential election. Party leader Sergey Kalyakin was the campaign manager of Milinkevich. April 2006 Sergey Kalyakin was sentenced to 15 days imprisonment for taking part in a peaceful march to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on 26 April.

In July 2006 the BPC suffered again a blow from the repressive regime as the pro-government Communist Party of Belarus claimed unification of the two communist parties. The BPC leadership however said that only two BPC members, who were earlier removed from the ranks of the party, attended the so-called merger conference. Party leader Kalyakin described the congress as a government orchestrated move to liquidate the party.

In November 2006 the party signed a document declaring the intention to form an alliance of left-wing parties with the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada, led by Alyaksandr Kazulin, and the Belarusian Women's Party "Nadzeya" led by Yelena Yeskova. At the ceremony, Sergei Kalyakin said that talks about an inter-party alliance had begun after the 2006 presidential election. He said that the three parties shared basic social democratic values, such as freedom, equality, solidarity, and justice.

In 2007, the head of the Belarusian Party of Communists, Sergey Kalyakin, was elected as one of the four rotational leaders of the Democratic Forces in Belarus.

Leader: Sergey Kalyakin

 

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Belarusian Party of Labour (BPL)
BPL was registered in February 1994. It identifies itself as a social democratic party with a labour-based orientation. Its aim was to provide political support for trade unions and workers’ movements. BPL opposes to Lukashenka’s regime.

On 2 August 2004 the party was liquidated as the Belarusian Supreme Court found it guilty of repeated violations to the Law on Political Parties, the Civil Code and its own charters. The party did continue to support the election campaign of the Five Plus coalition and the party leader, Alyaksandar Bukhvostaw, played an important role in the campaign of united opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich.

April 2006 Alyaksandar Bukhvostaw was sentenced to 15 days imprisonment for taking part in a peaceful march to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on 26 April.

Leader: Alyaksandar Bukhvostaw

 

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Conservative Christian Party BPF (CCP- BPF)
The party was registered in 2000, shortly after the split-up of BPF "Adradzhennie" (see above). The party calls itself the successor of the BPF. The CCP-BPF feels resistance to join supra-party bodies and the party co-ordinates its own activities. Paznyak made an attempt to run for president, which lead to strong protest among all parties as he might have divided the protest votes.

Unlike the other oppositional parties, the CCP-BPF boycotted the 2004 parliamentary elections. The party does not take part in any coalition and has a radical nationalist conservative orientation. In May 2006 the exiled leader, Zyanon Paznyak, was re-elected as the leader of the party at the party's 7th congress, held at the Palace of Culture of the Minsk Tractor factory.

Leader: Zenon Paznyak

 

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Belarusian Women’s Party “Nadzeya” (Hope)
The main aim of this party is to protect the right of women. A special convention in 2002 replaced its leader Valyantsina Palevikova with Valyantsina Matusevich. According to Matusevich, the convention was intended to reanimate the party and prevent it from disappearing from the political map of Belarus as a result of its announced merger with two social democratic parties. Palevikova responded that the convention was illegitimate and added that her dismissal was initiated by the new chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, Leonid Kozik, who was allegedly exerting pressure on the party's "trade-union" wing.

The party has been part of the European Coalition and cooperated closely with the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Narodnaya Hramada. In September 2006 Yelena Yeskova was elected leader at the party's 5th convention. Valyantsina Matusevich will remain involved as the deputy chairperson. Yelena Yeskova was an activist of the Belarusian Party of Labour until the Supreme Court of Belarus outlawed it in August 2004.

The newly elected leader noted that the party would continue its membership in inter-party bodies, including the Political Council of United Pro-democratic Forces.

In November 2006 the party signed a document declaring the intention to form an alliance of left-wing parties with the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada, led by Alyaksandr Kazulin, and the Belarusian Party of Communists led by Sergey Kaliakin. Yelena Yeskova emphasized the need for the alliance to combine efforts to democratize the country. She said that the alliance would make the parties stronger and their work easier.

Leader: Yelena Yeskova

 

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Pro-presidential parties
After the parliamentary elections of 2004 the number of parties represented in the National Assembly went down form six to three. The Republican Party of Labour and Justice (RPLJ), the Social-Democratic Party of Popular Accord (SDPPA) and the Belarusian Social Sporting Party (BSSP) lost their seats in parliament. The Communist Party of Belarus (CPB), the Agrarian Party (AP) and the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) remained. Together they hold 12 seats out of 110.

Communist Party of Belarus (CPB)
Although the Communist Party of Belarus was banned after the Moscow coup attempt of 1991, it has never lost importance as a political movement. Most members joined the new BPC in 1991, but after the 1996 referendum the CPB was re-installed and most the orthodox communist regrouped in the CPB. The party’s support base exists mainly of pensioners and civil servants. Its programme models itself after that of the former USSR, opposing reforms and privatisation and having a clear preference for the Russian culture (while rejecting the Belarusian culture). The party supports the president.

Leader: Valery Zaharchanka

 

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Agrarian Party (AP)
In 1992 executives of agricultural enterprises founded the United Agrarian Democratic Party. The party changed its name to the Agrarian Party in 1994. It has a program titled ’democratic socialism’. In the beginning, during the presidential election campaign in 1994, the party was in favour of creating a confederation of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. It was one of the biggest parties. After the 1996 reform of the parliament, the AP split. Half of it went to the Lukashenka-created House of Representatives, the others refused. This paralysed the party. It was not until 2000 before the AP more or less returned into the political arena, this time as a fully pro-presidential party. In that year, Schimanski was elected chairman.

Leader: Mikhail Schimanski

 

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Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
The party was founded in February 1994, modelled on and with support of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. The programme stated that the LDP was to counter national democrats responsible for the break-up of the union state. Initially the Russian LDP was enjoying huge popularity among (russified) citizens, however this waned, and Gaydukevich began to distance the party from its Russian counterpart.

The LDP is a party in which the personality of the leader plays a central role. Policies are totally determined by its leader. The ideology is skin-deep and the party profiles itself with popular slogans. In 2001 Gaydukevich announced his intension to run for president, contesting Lukashenka and democratic candidate Goncharik. The party has always supported Lukashenka’s policies and observers saw the Gaydukevich candidacy as a secret pre-elections alliance with the president. According to LDP leaders, the party has the largest number of members; more than 20,000 Belarusians.

Leader: Sergey Gaydukevich
www.ldpb.net

 

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OPPOSITIONAL YOUTH MOVEMENTS

Young Front (Malady Front)
One of the first and most influential youth organisations in Belarus is Young Front (Malady Front). The organisation was established as the youth branch of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) in 1996. In that year, the BNF experienced a substantial rise of young party members who were concerned with the increasingly authoritarian rule of President Lukashenka. Malady Front was established for these new young political activists.

Like its mother party, the organisation took up an anti-regime stance, upholding conservative, nationalist and Christian-Democratic principles. Not all members felt direct connection with the organisations, but Malady Front was the viable oppositionist youth organisation at that time.

Malady Front, although never officially registered and therefore an illegal organisation , was structured like a political party and thus was a rather hierarchical organisation. This is one of the reasons for the split in the organisation in 2000. In that year the members of Malady Front re-elected Pavel Seviarynets as President of the Organisation. In 1996 Seviarynets had been the main initiator of Malady Front and, being its leader since then, had formed the organisation to his own ideas. With Seviarynets re-election, a number of high placed Malady Front member decided to leave the organisation to start up a new, less hierarchical and less exclusive platform organisation. This would be the beginning of Zubr (see below).

The rest of Malady Front continued to stage protests and street actions. The movement aligned with Zubr and the European Coalition in the organisation of demonstrations after the elections and the referendum in 2004. The three were all proponents of non-violent demonstrations as a way to political change. However, instead of uniting into a single movement before the 2006 presidential elections, Malady Front initiated a new campaign.

In 2007, Young Front activists were increasingly charged with claims of membership of an illegal organisation etc.

(From: Schrama, Maartje (2007) Movements in Motion. An assessment of youth movements in the wave of electoral revolutions in Eastern Europe. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam)

 

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Zubr
In 2001, the youth organisation Zubr was established. The name Zubr refers to a rare European buffalo that lives in the forest. The location of the first gathering was in a forest in the western parts of Belarus, the same location as were 1991 former Russian president Yeltsin and former-Belarusian President Shushkevich signed the dissolution of the USSR and the establishment of the CIS.

Zubr was established to act as an umbrella organisation, open for all opposition movements in Belarus. The initiative for the establishment of Zubr was taken by former-members of Youth Front who were unhappy with the rather hierarchical structure of the Youth Front. In the first months of its existence, Zubre grew substantially to approx. 4000 “members”.

One of the main sources of inspiration for Zubr was the Serbian youth opposition-movement Optor. They felt connected to the Serbs because, like in Serbia, the opposition parties decided to boycott the parliamentary elections in protest against the Presidents illegitimate dominance of the parliament. There also was close contact with Optor’s main activists.

The main goal of Zubr was bringing democracy to Belarus and the country’s integration in the EU and NATO. The Zubr-activists based their actions on three elements: non-violence, solidarity and personal courage. Zubr communicated through an own newspaper, the internet (Zubr ceased updating its website in 2003) and by using graffiti to express their statements in the public spheres.

Between 2001 and 2004, Zubr organised some important opposition-campaigns, of which the Day of Solidarity-campaign was the most important. In this period, Zubr changed from an umbrella-organisation to an organisation that organised actions on its own. This development was sustained by the extensive training-program that was organised by Zubr. By training its members, the organisation strengthened itself. In 2005, Zubr got international attention when the Secretary of State of the U.S., Condoleezza Rice met the top of the activists of Zubr in Lithuania.

However, the increasing level of authoritarianism of President Lukashenka and increased power of the Belarusian secret-service caused an environment of fear in which it was hard for Zubr-activists to execute their actions and protests. For the presidential elections of 2006, Zubr supported the candidate of the united opposition, Aliaksandr Milinkevich. After these elections, when President Lukashenka as yet again able to prolong his stay in power, disregarding many protests of the opposition, the “brand” Zubr was disbanded.

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